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GEORGE HOBERG*

Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest
Service Law: The Battle over the Forest
Service Planning Rule
INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2000, in the waning days of the Clinton
administration, the Secretary of Agriculture issued the final rule
reviewing the regulations implementing the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).' This decision was the culmination of a nearly
decade-long process of redefining the mission of the USDA Forest
Service. In a striking departure from the agency's historical emphasis on
multiple use, the rule established ecological sustainability as the key
objective guiding planning for the national forests. The supporting
material for the rule explicitly states that "it is based on the
2
recommendations of an eminent committee of scientists." The secretary
appointed the Committee of Scientists in 1997, and the committee issued
its report March 15, 1999. The new policy was not in place for long,
however. The Bush administration suspended the rule in May 2001, and
in November 2002 issued a new proposed rule that would reverse a
number of changes embodied in the Clinton Rule.
The essay examines the Committee of Scientists and the Clinton
NFMA rule as a case study in the relation between science and politics in
the development and implementation of statutory standards for
management of the National Forest System. It begins with a brief review
of principles guiding the relations between Congress, courts, agencies,
and experts in the American administrative state. The essay then
considers these principles in light of the recent reality of forest policy
making in the modem era of fractious natural resource politics. Third, it
analyzes the evolution of planning under NFMA, with a focus on the
first Committee of Scientists and the diversity provisions of the statute.
Fourth, it analyzes the origins, mandate, and output of the Committee of
* Department of Forest Resources Management, University of British Columbia, 604
822 3728 (phone), 604 822 9106 (fax), hoberg@interchange.ubc.ca. An earlier version of this
essay was delivered at the University of Montana School of Forestry and Resources for the
Future, "Collaboration and Decision-making on the National Forests: Can It Work? Four
Perspectives of the Potential Problems and Opportunities." Jan. 22-23, 2001, University of
Montana, Missoula. I am grateful for comments from Roger Sedjo, Ross Gorte, Steve
Daniels, and Jim Lyons. Research for this essay has been supported by Resources for the
Future and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Scientists. Fifth, it examines how the Forest Service during the Clinton
administration responded to the committee. Sixth, the changes proposed
by the Bush administration in late 2002 are briefly reviewed. The
conclusion considers the broader question of whether the committee and
the Forest Service in their development of the Clinton NFMA rule
overstepped their appropriate roles in promoting what is essentially a
new statutory mandate.
The essay concludes that indeed they did but emphasizes the
dilemmas of how an administrative agency should act in the context of
shifting societal values and scientific understanding, on the one hand,
and a stalemated Congress incapable of acting, on the other hand. At the
outset, I want to make my position very clear. Personally, I think that
ecological sustainability should be the highest priority on U.S. federal
lands. However, I am troubled by how this value found its way into
federal law. I think it is important to distinguish preferences for policy
outcomes from principles about how institutions ought to work.
Otherwise, the legitimacy of the system is further tarnished. Recent
federal forest policy runs this risk. We need a new understanding of the
appropriate boundaries between science, politics, and law in federal
forest policy.
I. THE THEORY AND REALITY OF POLICY MAKING IN THE
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The American system of policy making has a clear set of
principles governing the relations between various actors in the process.
Congress, acting on the preferences of the voters who elected it, makes
the laws that establish the objectives for programs. Administrative
agencies, with congressional grants of authority and appropriations of
funds, implement the objectives established by Congress. In pursuing
their statutory mandates, agencies are expected to marshal expertise
from both within and outside the agency. The role of the courts is to
ensure that agencies do not deviate from their statutory mandates.3
Of course, things are not quite so simple. Citizens rarely pay
sufficient attention to complex policy issues to allow politicians to judge
their preferences, and interest groups eagerly fill the vacuum, creating a
cacophony of claims to represent the public interest. The legislative
process is extraordinarily complex, riddled with opportunities for those
who control veto points to frustrate the will of the majority. When
Congress and the president are controlled by the same party, 60 percent
majorities are needed to overcome the filibuster in the Senate. When the
two branches are controlled by different parties, the effective majority is
67 percent, the amount needed to overcome a presidential veto.
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Members of Congress, either because they do not understand the
complexities of policy issues or because they cannot agree among
themselves, typically adopt legislation that is too vague to address
conflicting objectives.5 As a result, administrative agencies are left the
task of clarifying the objectives and developing detailed programs.
Policy frequently results from a complex interaction between agencies
and reviewing courts, with Congress episodically reasserting itself
through the budgetary process or, less frequently, legislative change.
The role of science and expertise in the policy process is also
exceptionally complex. The traditional view of the politicsadministration dichotomy, in which politics provided the values and
administrators provided the expertise, has long since faded. Science can
rarely answer with an adequate degree of certainty the questions policy
makers pose.6 As a result, science becomes politicized as interest groups
adopt whatever factual claims support their views, and policy conflicts
7
frequently become heated disputes between credentialed experts.
II. THE PLURALIST FOREST POLICY REGIME
How does all of that play out in federal forest policy? Interest
groups pursue the venue where they perceive they have the best
advantage.8 Historically, industry groups have benefited from a cozy
relationship between the Forest Service and regional delegations of
Congress working through the appropriations process. Traditionally,
forest management was a regional concern dealt with by the regional
delegation of Congress through the appropriations process. 9 But in the
1970s, environmental groups broke up that iron triangle by getting the
courts to intervene and then by appealing to a more national political
audience through the authorization process in Congress. Not trusting the
agency to comply with its preferences, Congress appointed a scientific
committee to keep watch. When this new system did not result in
adequate policy change, in the late 1980s environmentalists went back to
the courts, new science in hand, and got injunctions in the Pacific
Northwest. The industry and regional political delegations fought back
through the appropriations process, and the beleaguered agency
thrashed around in vain for an acceptable solution. But the courts would
not let go, and eventually a new president, acting on the advice of a
scientific panel he commissioned, imposed a solution for that region that
the courts accepted. With the political process paralyzed by divided
government, the agency gradually went through a transformation of its
own. With the help of its own scientific committee, it asserted its own
new eco-friendly mission for the entire National Forest System.
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The development that ultimately undermined the traditional
forest policy regime was litigation in 1975 by environmental groups to
halt clearcutting.' ° Conservationists found an obscure provision of the
original authorizing statute of the Forest Service, the 1897 Organic Act,
that required harvested trees to be "dead or matured" and to be marked
before being cut. Although these requirements were legislated even
before the development of the forestry profession in the United States,
the court refused to defer to the Forest Service's interpretation of the
statute's meaning and enjoined clearcutting in the Monongahela
National Forest in West Virginia and the Tongass National Forest in
Alaska. By outlawing the most common method for harvesting timber,
these rulings created a crisis in timber management. Congress was
forced to rewrite forest management laws to address the impasse."
In revising the statute, Congress was acting in a political
environment far more favorable to environmental interests. The
mobilization of environmental groups and more environmentally
oriented public opinion elevated environmental protection as a policy
objective and downgraded traditional timber interests. The courtimposed clearcut ban also gave environmentalists and their supporters
in Congress a strategic advantage in that the alternative to new legislation was a very pro-environment status quo.
Adopted in 1976, the National Forest Management Act
transformed forest policy in several ways. First, it shifted jurisdiction
over forest policy from the appropriations committees, dominated by
industry and regional interests, to authorizing committees far more
sensitive to national environmental constituencies. Appropriations
committees continued to be powerful vehicles for the representation of
regional interests, 2 but they were now more effectively balanced by proenvironment authorizing committees.
Second, NFMA elaborated the planning process, in which the
Forest Service is required to prepare long-term, integrated plans for each
national forest.' 3 This planning process transformed the forest policy
process by dramatically expanding opportunities for public participation, intensifying the role of the courts, introducing new government
officials representing new values into the policy process, and eventually
leading to a change in the scientific knowledge base underlying forest
policy plans. 14
Third, NFMA required changes in forest practice regulations to
shift forest policy away from its historical emphasis on timber extraction.
The clearcutting crisis created by the court rulings was resolved by
permitting clearcutting but requiring the agency to institute forest
practices protecting a wide range of resource values - water, fisheries,
wildlife, soils, and so on. In developing these standards, the Forest
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5
Service imposed a number of restrictions on its own discretion. The
most consequential turned out to be the agency's interpretation of that
statute's language for the protection of wildlife. NFMA requires that
forest planning "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities
16
This diversity
in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives."
provision originated from two concerns. The first was an effort to
increase the protection of wildlife in the agency's multiple-use equation,
and the second was to restrict the conversion of native stands into exotic
or monoculture plantations. 7 The implementing regulations transformed
this general guideline into a stringent requirement: "fish and wildlife
habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing
8
native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area."'
This regulation would eventually lead to a fundamental transformation
of forest policy.

III. THE EVOLUTION OF NFMA PLANNING
Prior to the adoption of the 2000 revisions, NFMA planning rules
went through an extraordinary evolution. An exceptionally vague
statutory mandate to protect species diversity was clarified by a scientific
committee and agency rulemaking, and then transformed by a remarkable episode of judicial policy making into sharp cutbacks in logging in
one region. The approach to planning in that region, which changed the
agency's mission from multiple use to giving priority to ecosystem
protection, then spilled over into other regions and filtered its way up to
the agency leadership and finally was adopted as regulation.
A.The First Committee of Scientists
When adopting NFMA, Congress took the novel step of
requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to appoint a committee of
9
scientists to propose the implementing regulations for NFMA. The
committee's directive from Congress was as follows:
[T]he Secretary of Agriculture shall appoint a committee of
scientists who are not officers or employees of the Forest
Service. The committee shall provide scientific and
technical advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and
procedures to assure an effective interdisciplinary
approach is proposed and adopted. The committee shall
terminate upon promulgation of the regulations. The views
of the committee shall be included in the public information supplied when the regulations are proposed for
adoption.2 °
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This extraordinary initiative clearly reflects a deep congressional
distrust for the capacity of the Forest Service to develop regulations in a
manner reflecting the new statutory standards. 2' The committee played a
direct role in writing the regulations that were adopted by the Secretary
of Agriculture in 1979. Its members clearly understood that they were
doing more than providing scientific and technical advice. According to
its chair, Arthur Cooper, from North Carolina State, "We understood
that we were helping to resolve policy issues that had been sidestepped
by policymakers."22
The implementation of the new regulations was stalled,
however, when the Reagan administration targeted them for overhaul as
part of Vice President Bush's Task Force on Regulatory Relief. The
Reagan administration's draft revision was met with a very strong
environmental backlash. In response, the Forest Service reconvened the
Cooper committee of scientists, and the committee helped the Forest
Service rewrite the changes so that they very closely resembled the
original regulations adopted in 1979. Thus, the Cooper committee was
instrumental in writing the 1979 regulations and was then used in 1982
by the Forest Service to deflect pressure from its superiors to weaken the
regulations.23
This committee helped establish a pattern for the resolution of
modern forest policy conflicts. Many of the issues were value questions
of balancing conflicting objectives that were cast in technical terms to
promote the social and political legitimacy of the outcomes. According to
Steven Daniels,
Even though forestry's most intractable dilemmas stem
from differences in value hierarchies, debates about them
tend to be cast in technical terms. As such, scientists are
asked to resolve social questions as fundamental as equity
and appropriate rates of economic growth by focusing on
technical resource issues that serve as convenient proxies.24
We see this pattern continued with the Gang-of-Four report, the Interagency Committee of Scientists (ICS), the Forest Ecosystem Management
Assessment Team (FEMAT), and, finally, the most recent Committee of
Scientists.
B. The Judicial Transformation of NFMA

5

The new standards of the 2000 NFMA regulations have their
origins in a remarkable episode of judicial policy making involving the
infamous Northern spotted owl and the old-growth forests of the Pacific
Northwest. Environmental groups combined a lobbying strategy to

Winter 2004]

THE FOREST SERVICE PLANNING RULE

nationalize the issue with a brilliantly successful litigation strategy to
bring logging in the region's forests to a virtual halt. In developing a
response to these challenges, the Forest Service was forced to rely
increasingly on the new science of conservation biology, which has
revolutionized the ways the forests in the region are being managed. The
Pacific Northwest was the crucible for forest policy changes that have
spilled over into other regions and eventually into national policy.
The legal and political controversy over old-growth forests in the
Northwest emerged in late 1987.26 There is a widespread perception that
these legal conflicts centered on the Endangered Species Act. There was,
in fact, litigation over whether the Northern spotted owl should be
listed, but it turned out to have little practical significance. Rather, the
litigation centered on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and particularly NFMA and its regulations on species viability. In
December 1988, the Forest Service finalized its supplemental environmental impact statement on the spotted owl and issued new regional
guidelines for its protection. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund sued in
the district court in Seattle, and, in March 1989, Judge William Dwyer
ruled that the plan was inadequate and issued his first injunction on
timber sales in Washington and Oregon. This injunction-as it turned
out, the first of many-was a pivotal event in the history of Northwest
forest policy because it changed the beneficiary of the status quo. Now,
for affected timber sales to go forward, the Forest Service either had to
comply with the judge's strict interpretation of the law or Congress had
to take specific action to change the law as it applied in this case. Success
in the judicial arena gave environmentalists new power resources in the
executive and legislative arenas.
The Northwest delegation to Congress sought to regain control
over the issue by attaching riders to appropriations bills exempting
relevant logging activities from lawsuits. 27 In response, environmentalists revamped their strategy, recognizing that as long as oldgrowth forests were considered a regional issue, they would continue to
lose in Congress. According to Andy Kerr of the Oregon Natural
Resources Council, "expecting the Northwest congressional delegation
to be rational about ending the cutting of ancient forests in the late 1980s
is like expecting the delegation from the American South to deal
rationally with ending segregation in the late 1950s. " 28 Environmentalists understood that to succeed politically, they would have to
nationalize the issue. Public opinion surveys show that there are
significant differences between the national and regional publics on
these issues, with the national public being consistently more proenvironment. The timing for the nationalization of the old-growth debate
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could not have been better, as environmental issues more generally were
gaining extraordinary salience nationwide.
The revamped environmental strategy was extraordinarily
successful. Although it resurfaced briefly in 1995, the use of appropriations riders to change forest policy had been largely delegitimized by
environmental advocates' concurrent political campaign to nationalize
the issue. Legislators outside the region began taking an interest in the
issue, and authorizing committees, whose statutes were being quietly
rewritten, began to reassert their jurisdictional interests in the issue.
The focus of the process returned to efforts by the Forest Service
and associated agencies to develop a plan for the protection of the
spotted owl that could win judicial approval. A haphazard plan put
together by the hostile Bush administration was challenged in court, and
Judge Dwyer again ruled in favor of environmentalists, chastising the
government for "a deliberate and systematic refusal... to comply with the
laws protecting wildlife" 29 The law referred to here was the species
viability section of the NFMA regulations. Dwyer ordered the Forest
Service to develop "revised standards and guidelines to ensure the
northern spotted owl's viability" by March 1992 and enjoined the timber
sales until it did so.
The Forest Service went back to work. This time, in addition to
following proper legal procedures, the agency turned to the results of a
scientific panel the administration had established in late 1989. 30 The
Interagency Scientific Committee to Address the Conservation of the
Northern Spotted Owl, chaired by Jack Ward Thomas, issued its report
in May 1990, recommending the retention of large blocks of old-growth
habitat. In March 1992, the Forest Service adopted a new plan based on
the "Thomas report," setting aside about eight million acres of oldgrowth forest for spotted owl habitat. Environmentalists sued again. In
late May 1992, Judge Dwyer rejected the Forest Service's attempt to
adopt the Thomas report as its spotted owl plan. The most striking part
of the decision was his ruling that the plan was flawed because it did not
3
adequately address issues related to species other than the spotted owl. 1
Continuing the pattern of previous cases, Dwyer imposed an injunction
on timber sales until a satisfactory plan was put in place.
The decision stunned the Forest Service. Not only was the
Thomas report, a state-of-the art scientific document in 1990, ruled
inadequate, but the whole objective of the process was redefined by
judicial order. The scope of the issue was significantly enlarged from one
species of owl to an entire ecosystem. A far more sophisticated analytical
process was necessary to address this larger problem. As a result, a new
scientific committee was commissioned, again under the leadership of
Jack Ward Thomas, this time called the Scientific Assessment Team.
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The Forest Service was not alone in marshaling scientific opinion
to try to resolve the conflict. Congress gave its stamp of approval to the
Interagency Scientific Committee that the administration had formed
and a year later commissioned its own assessment to examine oldgrowth ecosystem issues beyond the Northern spotted owl. The so-called
"Gang-of-Four Report"32 had no impact on the stalemate over Northwest
forests in Congress but was very influential in the options developed by
subsequent scientific committees.33
With Clinton's election, the executive arena was transformed,
with pro-timber officials being replaced by pro-environmental officials.
Making good on a campaign promise, the administration held a "forest
summit" on April 2, 1993, in Portland, Oregon. The president, vicepresident, and six cabinet officials spent an entire day around a table
listening to presentations on one regional issue. In his closing remarks,
Clinton committed his administration to the development of a plan that
34
is "scientifically sound, ecologically credible, and legally responsible."
To implement this commitment, the Clinton administration
established the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team
(FEMAT). FEMAT was a bigger and broader group than any of the
previous committees. In addition to examining management strategies to
preserve the viability of the owl and the Marbled murrelet, FEMAT was
also charged with examining the "maintenance and/or restoration of
habitat conditions to support viable populations, well distributed across
their current range, of species known (or reasonably expected) to be
associated with old-growth forest conditions" 3' The team assessed ten
management options, many of them developed by the Gang-of-Four
report, on a broad range of consequences, ranging from the viability of
more than 1000 species to impacts on timber supply and related
employment.
The Clinton administration selected Option 9. The resulting
Northwest Forest Plan, announced on July 1, 1993, called for an annual
harvest level of 1.2 billion board feet (bf), which FEMAT concluded was
the maximum cut permissible under current law. In addition, the plan
provided for extensive reserves for spotted owl protection and
dramatically expanded riparian reserves for the protection of fish
36
habitat.
The compromise was bitterly attacked from all sides. Industry
and labor groups said the dramatically reduced cuts would devastate
timber-dependent rural communities. Environmentalists harshly
criticized the size of the cut and especially the nature of the old-growth
reserves, which would not be inviolate: some logging for fire or insect
salvage would be allowed, as would some thinning of second-growth
stands to promote old-growth characteristics.
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Although environmentalists seemed as outraged as the timber
industry and loggers, they had in fact achieved a remarkable victory. To
put Clinton's plan in perspective, one need only go back to 1989. During
the debate of section 318 in 1989, environmentalists proposed an
allowable cut level of 4.8 bbf per year-four times higher than the level
they considered too high in 1993. This shift indicates the dramatic
redistribution of powers achieved after four years of effective lobbying in
Congress, a successful public relations campaign to polish and
nationalize the issue, and, especially, a brilliant litigation campaign.
Environmentalists were not satisfied, however, and, once the
plan was finalized in April 1994, they challenged the plan in court again.
This time industry challenged the decision as well, arguing that the
process used to develop the plan violated the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. In what began to mark the appearance of finality on this
policy issue, Judge Dwyer upheld the Clinton forest plan in December
1994, brushing aside the criticisms from both sides.37
The Republican "revolution" in Congress did not bring the issue
back to the fore, however. Although the GOP had relatively little success
at rolling back environmental laws, one modest success was a rider to
the 1995 Rescissions Act. Originally understood as an effort to facilitate
the harvesting of fire- or insect-damaged trees, the rider has turned out
to be far more sweeping, opening up areas of old-growth forests that had
been protected in the Clinton forest plan and insulating many timber
sales from citizen appeals and environmental reviews. Most of the
political fights over forests in 1995 and 1996 involved this rider.38 Despite
all the sound and fury, the rider expired at the end of 1996, and industry
and its supporters in Congress appear to have little inclination to
rejuvenate the strategy. The rider did increase logging, some of it in oldgrowth forests, but industry and environmentalists both agree that the
total amount is extremely small-less than one percent of the remaining
old-growth forest in the region.
Environmental groups have remained vigilant in the administrative and legal arenas as well. When the Forest Service prepared
timber sales without doing the wildlife surveys promised by the
Northwest Forest Plan, environmental groups challenged the agency in
court in a 1999 case. 39 Judge Dwyer again agreed with the environmentalists and enjoined the sales.4 °
This case study reveals the success of a concerted campaign by
environmental groups to change forest policy in fundamental ways.
Although they did not get everything they wanted, the case reflects an
extraordinary victory for the environmental movement. The strategy can
be boiled down to two tactics: nationalization and judicialization. The
victory would not have been possible if the issue had remained regional,
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as forest policy traditionally has been. And it is perhaps the most
extreme case of judicial intervention into environmental policy making.
From the time of his first injunction in 1989 to his approval of the Clinton
forest plan in late 1994, Judge Dwyer essentially managed Region 6 of
the Forest Service. When, in 1999, the agency drifted from its previous
commitments, Dwyer reemerged to force the agency to abide by strict
interpretations of the 1994 plan. The impact on traditional measures of
forest policy has been enormous. After peaking at 5.6 billion bf in 1987,
harvest levels in the region have fallen by a factor of ten -to 570 million
bf in 1999, well below the 1.2 billion bf provided for in the Clinton forest
plan.
Environmentalists would respond that Dwyer was merely
enforcing the law, and they have a point. The regulations promulgated
to implement NFMA's diversity requirements elevated the status of
species protection in the agency's multiple-use equations and forced the
agency into unexpectedly preservationist decisions. As the priority given
to non-timber values increased, the expertise of biologists and ecologists
increased in importance, and so did their influence in the region. The
new science of ecosystem management, implied by NFMA viability
regulations, began to take shape in the development and implementation
of the Clinton forest plan.
C. The Spread to Other Regions
After the crisis in the Pacific Northwest, the agency began to
reconsider its management of forests in other regions. In Alaska, the
Forest Service began working on applying the concepts emerging from
the Northwest to the Tongass National Forest. When the region issued its
new management plan in 1997, it called for a 50 percent decrease in
harvest levels.4' In the Pacific Southwest region, after protracted
conflict,42 in May 2000 the Forest Service issued a new draft
environmental impact statement for its proposed Sierra Nevada Forest
Plan. The draft mentions two preferred alternatives, both of which
would lead to significant reductions in harvest levels, especially after the
first five years. Even the preferred alternative with higher proposed
timber sales levels would reduce sales in the year 2005 to 50 percent
below levels allowed under the 1993 interim guidelines and 80 percent
levels before the spotted owl protections were put in place. The plan was
finalized January 13, 2001.
Another major effort involves the Columbia River Basin in
eastern Washington and Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. The Clinton
administration created the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project, which is developing an integrated ecosystem plan for the
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region. Here the preferred alternative, announced in March 2000, would
actually increase harvest levels, but the objectives of timber harvesting
would undergo a profound change. Management objectives would shift
from emphasis on timber production to emphasis on the restoration of
forest health and old-growth ecosystems.43
IV. THE COMMITTEE OF SCIENTISTS
Developments in the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, the Columbia
basin, and the Sierra Nevada all demonstrate the immense implications
of the legal decisions arising from the interpretations, during the
Northern spotted owl case, of the viability regulations promulgated
under NFMA. Although the act was explicitly designed as a multiple-use
statute, the implementation of its viability regulations forced the agency
to subordinate timber production and other economic outputs to the
preservation of ecosystems. As a result, the agency's emerging de facto
mission appeared to be in profound conflict with its official statutory
mandate." This has created serious tensions within the agency and in its
political environment, leading several prominent observers to suggest
that the Forest Service may have outlived its utility as a separate
administrative entity.45
The legislative stalemate of the 1990s made any statutory
resolution of this issue unlikely. The Republican Congress opposes the
shift toward greater concern with environmental values, but Democratic
control of the White House up through 2000 ensured that any attempt to
override the judicial decisions with new statutory language would be
vetoed. In this vacuum of political leadership, the Forest Service
attempted to redefine its own mandate. Mike Dombeck, chief of the
Forest Service, made several speeches trying to hook a new ecosystem
focus onto the watershed protection provisions of the ancient Organic
Administration Act of 1887.46
More importantly, the agency appointed a Committee of
Scientists in 1997 to review the land and resource management planning
process. Note in particular the italicized words in the charter of the
committee:
The purpose of this committee is to provide scientific and
technical advice to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief
of the Forest Service on improvements that can be made in
the National Forest System Land and Resource Management planning process.
The Committee should address such topics as how to
consider the following in land and resource management
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plans: biological diversity, use of ecosystem assessments in
land and resource management planning, spatial and
temporal scales for planning, public participation
processes, sustainable forestry, interdisciplinary analysis,
and any other issues that the Committee identifies that
should be addressed in revised planning regulations.
In its report, the Committee shall make recommendations on
how best to accomplish sound resource planning within the
established framework of environmental laws and within the
statutory mission of the Forest Service. The Committee shall
also provide technical advice on the land and resource
management planning process; and provide materials for
the Forest Service to consider for incorporation into the
revised planning regulations. The Committee shall also
recommend improvements in Forest Service coordination
with other Federal land management or resource protection
agencies, state and local government agencies, and tribal
governments recognizing the unique roles and responsibilities of each agency in the planning process.
The Committee shall consist of no more than 12 members
and a Committee Chair appointed by the Secretary of
Agriculture. Officers or employees of the Forest Service
may not serve as members of the Committee....
The Committee shall consist of representatives of a variety
of academic disciplines, including but not limited to, the
following: forest and range ecology, fish and wildlife
biology,
silviculture,
hydrology,
natural
resource
economics, sociology, public participation and conflict
management, ecosystem management, land management
planning, and natural resource law. Committee members
should have a demonstrated ability to work across scientific
and resource management disciplines. Collectively, the
members should represent a diversity of disciplines and
perspectives, have a knowledge of the National Forest
System, insights into the National Forest Management Act
and its implementation, and National Forest System
planning.47
Note that nowhere does the charter ask for the committee to propose a
new mission or objective for the agency. The committee members are
listed in the following table.
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1998 Committee of Scientists Members
Dr. K. Norman Johnson (chair)
Dr. James Agee
Dr. Robert Beschta
Bob Cunningham
Dr. Virginia Dale
Dr. Linda Hardesty
Dr. James Long
Dr. Larry Nielson
Dr. Barry Noon
Dr. Roger Sedjo
Dr. Margaret Shannon
Dr. Ronald Trosper
Dr. Charles Wilkinson

Dep't of Forest Resources, Oregon
State Univ.
College of Forest Resources, Univ. of
Washington
Dep't of Forest Engineering, Oregon
State Univ.
Environmental Compliance Manager, National Science Foundation
Environmental Sciences Div., Oak
Ridge National Laboratory
Dep't of Natural Resources Science,
Washington State Univ.
Dep't of Forest Resources, Utah State
Univ.
School of Forest Resources, The
Pennsylvania State Univ.
Dep't of Fishery & Wildlife Biology,
Colorado State Univ.
Resources for the Future
Maxwell School of Citizenship &
Public Affairs, Syracuse Univ.
School of Forestry, Northern Arizona
Univ.
Univ. of Colorado Law School

Despite its title and its mandate to provide "scientific and
technical advice," the committee had no qualms about proposing new
policy objectives for the agency. 48 The committee urged the agency to
consider sustainability its "guiding star." When sustainability is defined
as a triad of ecological, economic, and social elements, the concept is not
multiple-use
management:
much different from old-fashioned
competing objectives are pursued within a larger framework to achieve
societal objectives. 49 However, the committee clearly goes beyond that in
declaring that "ecological" should be given priority over social and
economic sustainability:
The Committee recommends that ecological sustainability
provide a foundation upon which the management for
national forests and grasslands can contribute to economic
and social sustainability. This finding does not mean that
the Forest Service is expected to maximize the protection of
plant and animal species and environmental protection to
the exclusion of other human values and uses. Rather, it
means that planning for the multiple use and sustained
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yield of the resources of national forests and grasslands
should operate within a baseline level of ensuring the
sustainability of ecological systems and native species.
Without ecologically sustainable systems, other uses of the
land and its resources could be impaired."
The committee presents its case for the primacy of ecological
sustainability in chapter 6 of its report, as well as in the synopsis. The
case is made in two ways, factual and legal. The factual case is made
following a recitation of the benefits that come from the forests.
Such benefits include: clear air and water, productive soils,
biological diversity, goods and services, employment
opportunities, community benefits, recreation, and
naturalness. They also provide intangible benefits such as
beauty, inspiration, and wonder.5
Although this sentence mentions goods and services, it is fascinating that
the committee does not use the word "timber." The committee continues:
Yet these benefits depend upon the longer term
sustainability of the watersheds, forests, and rangelands if
the public is to enjoy the ecological, economic, and social
values that these lands can provide. Accordingly, based on
the statutory framework for the national forests and
grasslands, the first priority for management is to retain
and restore the ecological sustainability of these
watersheds, forests, and rangelands for present and future
generations.
In expanding upon the legal case, the committee states that a
"suite of laws call for ecological sustainability." It refers to the
Endangered Species Act, the diversity provisions of NFMA, and the
Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act's call for "achievement and
maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level or regular periodic output of
the various renewable resources of the national forests without
impairment of the productivity of the land."5 3 The argument for a more
ecologically defined mission is obviously stronger if statutes outside the
core forest statutes are considered. The committee was well staffed to
make such a legal assertion, as Charles Wilkinson is arguably the
nation's leading expert on forest law.
What the argument overlooks, however, is that what forced all
the action in the agency was not this broad suite of laws but the NFMA
viability regulations. Even Assistant Secretary James Lyons has argued
this in print.5 4 It is surprising that there is not a broader discussion in the
committee's report of the potential conflicts with the larger multiple-use
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mandate. For example, Mark Rutzick, a forest industry lawyer, makes a
strong case that the legislative history of NFMA shows that the priority
given to ecological values in the viability regulations is contrary to
congressional intent. In both the House and the Senate, amendments to
change the diversity section to make it more like the viability regulations
were explicitly considered and rejected.5" In a law review article,
Wilkinson makes the opposite argument, stating, "The agency seems
increasingly to be imbued with the primacy of biodiversity as a
management goal. Proceeding in this way is within the NFMA mission
and procedures, because the Act was drafted in a sufficiently broadgauged way."5 6 But neither his argument in the law review article nor
the Committee of Scientists' report specifically rebuts the claim made by
Rutzick and colleagues.5 7
But what I find even more striking is that the committee never
makes a scientific case for the primacy of ecological sustainability. The
room for making a case is certainly there. In the context of integrated
resource management, both an economic and a scientific case can be
made that competing benefits simply cannot be simultaneously
provided, and one resource needs to be given priority. I take this to be
the logic behind the committee's factual assertion, but the report does
not provide any evidence to support it. The closest it comes is the
following paragraph:
In addition to the suite of environmental laws calling for
protection of ecological systems, scientific results and
common sense point to the necessity of protecting forests
and rangelands so they continue providing benefits to
society. Lessons from across the National Forest System
suggest that the conservation of ecological systems cannot
be ignored. As an example, concerns over the effect that
declining water clarity will have on tourism in Lake Tahoe
have led to an intensive and expensive effort to reverse this
trend .... Once ecological systems are pushed to the edge,
the costs of recovery can be high, and the ability to apply
adaptive management is significantly compromised.58
In the next paragraph, the committee does make an explicit factvalue distinction but then merely reasserts the factual claim.
While the scientific community can help eliminate the risk
associated with different management strategies, decisions
about an acceptable level of risk are value-based, not
science-based decisions .... Nonetheless, it is clear that ecological sustainability lays a necessary foundation for
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national forests and grasslands to contribute to the
economic and social components of sustainability...59
If this prioritization of ecological sustainability is so self-evident, why
didn't Congress enshrine it in NFMA in 1976? If 25 years of working
under NFMA have made this self-evident, where is the evidence and
documentation?
I am not in any way arguing that the recommendations on
ecological sustainability came as a surprise to the agency or were
unwelcome. Even before the committee was named, the agency was
expressing a new ecologically oriented mission in its strategic plans and
annual report. For example, in its strategic planning exercise completed
in 1997, the agency described its mission as follows:
To sustain the health, productivity and diversity of the land
to meet the needs of present and future generations.... As
the lead Federal agency in natural resources conservation,
the Forest Service provides leadership in the protection,
management, and use of the Nation's forest, rangeland and
aquatic
ecosystems. Our ecosystem approach to
management integrates ecological, economic and social
factors to maintain and enhance the quality of the
environment to meet current and future needs. Through
implementation of land and resource management plans,
the agency will ensure sustainable ecosystems and provide
recreation, water, timber, minerals, fish, wildlife,
wilderness, and aesthetic values for current and future
60
generations on [National Forest System] lands.
In pursuit of this mission, the agency adopted the following objectives:
(1) ensure sustainable ecosystems, (2) provide multiple benefits for
people within the capability of ecosystems, and (3) ensure organizational
effectiveness. 6' The language of the first two objectives makes clear that
timber harvest and other economic activities, including recreation, can be
pursued only within the context of the dominant objective of ensuring
healthy ecosystems.
Thus, the conclusion of the Committee of Scientists was clearly
consistent with the intentions of agency leadership. Nonetheless, the
assertion of ecological sustainability as the primary goal of the agency
appears to go beyond the committee's mandate to provide scientific and
technical advice. Moreover, to the extent that the committee supported
this new objective with factual claims, it relied heavily on mere assertion
and did not provide any detailed factual rationale or scientific evidence.
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V. THE 2000 RULE OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
The Department of Agriculture proposed a new rule for
National Forest System planning in October 1999.62 The proposal relied
heavily on the ideas and language of the Committee of Scientists' report.
Section 219.2, Goals and Principles for Planning, explicitly states, "The
goals and principles for planning are those recommended by the
Committee of Scientists.... 63 In the section designed to replace the
species viability section of the earlier rule, section 219.20 proclaims the
agency's commitment to ecological sustainability. The rationale states,
"This section incorporates the key principles and desired outcomes for
ecological sustainability that were outlined in the Committee of
Scientists' Report." 64 In justifying ecological sustainability, the rationale
follows the lead of the Committee of Scientists and states, "The concept
of managing the national forests and grasslands in an ecologically
sustainable manner can be traced back over 100 years." It then cites the
same acts, from the Organic Act of 1897 to the Multiple-Use and
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA), Endangered Species Act, NEPA, and
NFMA.
In the preamble to the final rule, issued November 9, 2000, the
agency explicitly addressed the criticism raised in the comment period
that the preeminence given to ecological sustainability exceeded the
agency's statutory mandate. The agency responded as follows:
Although some respondents perceived a conflict between
emphasis on sustainable ecosystems and legislative
mandates, the Department does not believe this is true.
Instead, the Department sees ecological sustainability not
only as a complement to multiple-use, sustained-yield
management, but also a prerequisite for it. It is the Department's view that the rule is consistent with the Forest
Service's conservation and legislative mandates. Contrary
to some comments, the proposed rule did not change the
overarching purpose of planning. Rather, it affirmed the
direction in the MUSYA. 65
This statement is striking, given that section 219.2 of the proposed rule,
entitled "Goals and principles for planning," begins, "Goal: Planning
must be directed toward assuring the ecological sustainability of our
watersheds, forests, and rangelands."66
The criticisms about mandate did lead the Forest Service to
change the language defining sustainability in section 219.1, "Purpose."
The proposal read, "Sustainability is broadly recognized to be composed
67
of interdependent elements, ecological, economic, and social." The final
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rule directly linked that statement to the MUSYA mandate:
"Sustainability, composed of interdependent ecological, social, and
economic elements, embodies the principles of multiple-use and
sustained-yield without impairment of the productivity of the land."68 In
addition, section 219.2 was changed slightly to read, "The first priority
for planning to guide the management of the National Forest System is
to maintain or restore ecological sustainability of national forests and
grasslands to provide for a wide variety of uses, values, products, and
services." Both changes were clearly made to link ecological
sustainability more directly to the formal statutory mandate of the
agency. However, the final rule still asserted the primacy of ecological
sustainability and for that reason was vulnerable to the charge that it
exceeded the multiple-use mandate established by Congress.
VI. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE
The Bush administration clearly has a different approach to
environmental issues generally and forest policy in particular. In terms
of personnel, Clinton's Undersecretary of Agriculture, Jim Lyons, an ally
of environmental groups, was replaced by Mark Rey, who worked at the
American Forest and Paper Association, the leading forest industry
association, before serving on the Senate GPO committee staff. The Bush
administration moved quickly to review the new rule and in May 2001
issued a Federal Register notice suspending its application. In December
2002, the administration proposed a new rule that, if adopted, would
represent a marked departure from the 2000 rule and the 1982 rule it
replaced.69
Among the several significant changes in the Bush proposal, in
the context of this analysis, two in particular stand out. First, the
administration proposes to remove the priority of ecological sustainability over economic and social sustainability. The new language
emphasizes integration and balance:
This proposed rule emphasizes the interconnection
between the ecological, social, and economic components of
sustainability, and requires consideration of each in the
planning process .... In contrast to the 2000 rule, this concept
of sustainability is linked more closely to the MUSYA in
that economic and social components are treated as
interdependent with ecological aspects of sustainability,
70
rather than as secondary considerations.
Thus, while embracing the modern term of sustainability, the Bush
proposal reverses the Clinton rule's new mission of prioritizing
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ecological sustainability and returns to the balancing approach more
consistent with the multiple-use mandate as traditionally defined.
Second, the Bush proposal would eliminate the mandatory
protection of species viability contained in the 1982 rules and carried
forward in the 2000 rule; instead, it outlines two options for the viability
provision, neither of which contains mandatory language. The Bush
proposal is compared with the earlier versions in the following chart."
1982 regulations. "Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to
maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native
vertebrate species in the planning area. For planning purposes, a
viable population shall be regarded as one which has the estimated
numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area." 36 CFR
§ 219.19.
2000 regulations. "Plan decisions affecting species diversity must
provide for ecological conditions that the responsible official
determines provide a high likelihood that those conditions are capable
of supporting over time the viability of native and desired non-native
species well distributed throughout their ranges within the plan area,
except as provided in paragraphs (b) (2) (ii-iv) of this section." 36 CFR
§ 219.20(b)(2).
2002 draft regulations. Option 1: "Plan decisions should provide for
ecological conditions that the responsible official determines provides
a high likelihood of supporting over time the viability of native and
desired non-native vertebrates and vascular plants well distributed
within their ranges in the plan area." § 219.13(b)(2)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg.
72800.
2002 draft regulations. Option 2: "Plan decisions, to the extent
feasible, should foster the maintenance and restoration of biological
diversity in the plan area, at ecosystem and species levels, within the
range of biological diversity characteristic of native ecosystems within
the larger landscape in which the plan is embedded." § 219.13(b)(2)(i),
67 Fed. Reg. 72802.
Given the pivotal role of the mandatory nature of the viability
regulations in shaping the dramatic change in federal forest policy over
the 1990s, the implications of these proposed changes are potentially
immense.
In other significant changes, the regulations would create a
blanket exemption from NEPA for forest plans, create more flexibility in
the application of environmental standards, and limit the appeals
process for forest plans.
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If enacted, these proposals could fundamentally reshape policy
on federal forestlands by undermining the twin pillars of the environmental groups' strategy on federal forest policy: judicialization and
nationalization. By removing the mandatory language in the viability
provisions, the regulation could undermine the legal basis used to force
the Forest Service to act to protect wildlife in several regions of the
country. By reducing appeals and exempting forest plans from NEPA
requirements, environmentalists would have fewer causes to bring
action in court challenging Forest Service decision making. By giving
greater discretion to "responsible officials" in the regions, the proposed
regulation is also designed to allow local managers to adapt
management provisions to local circumstances, thus decentralizing
decision making.
Environmentalists have been sharply critical of the proposal.
Democratic members of Congress have also denounced it. In their
critique, Democrats on the House Committee on Resources chastised the
Bush administration for not relying on a committee of scientists in
developing their proposal.
Finally, we question why you have rejected the bipartisan
precedent of three previous Administrations in declining to
convene an independent Committee of Scientists to assist in
revising the rule .... There is good reason for this consistent
precedent: the planning rule is too important to be shaped
by partisan politics, but must be grounded in an
independent assessment of applicable scientific principles.
The Forest Service cannot credibly claim that it has relied
on the Committee of Scientists convened for the 2000
rulemaking. The agency never solicited the views of this
earlier Committee on this proposed rule, as the NFMA
provides, nor did the Forest Service adopt the previous
Committee's recommendations for rigorous wildlife
protection and monitoring provisions. We urge you to
convene a Committee of Scientists before revising the
rule.72
Rather than demanding that Congress address the question of how
ecological sustainability should be balanced with social and economic
sustainability or squarely address the question of whether protection of
species viability should be mandatory, the representatives call instead
for another committee of scientists.73
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Johnson Committee of Scientists followed a long pattern of
employing scientific advisers to help resolve difficult forest policy
74
conflicts. When Congress enacted NFMA in 1976, it did not trust the
Forest Service to write its own regulations, so it gave the task to a
committee of scientists. When the Forest Service wanted to deflect
Reagan administration efforts to weaken those regulations, it reconvened
the committee to help it. When the Democratic Congress was vexed by
the controversy over the Northern spotted owl, it commissioned the
Gang-of-Four report. After having its own efforts flatly rejected by Judge
Dwyer, the Bush administration turned to the ICS, and then the Scientific
Assessment Team. When the Clinton administration took over, it turned
to FEMAT. Thus, the Johnson Committee of Scientists was not a new
strategy in forest policy. However, the committee asserted a different
role, and its results were used in an unprecedented way. None of the
committees dealing with the Pacific Northwest spilled over into raw
policy. Certainly, the Cooper committee did. For example, its transformation of the vague diversity provision of NFMA into the rigorous
viability regulations was an exercise in policy making. But the difference
was that Congress had explicitly invited its participation. None of the
scientific committees went as far as the Johnson Committee of Scientists
in articulating a new mission for the agency.
Forest management is a difficult challenge that involves complex
questions of science and values. By continuing to cloak political choices
about values in the language of science, American forest policy raises
challenging questions about political accountability and the appropriate
boundaries between experts and policy makers. Indeed, forest policy
seems quite out of step on this issue compared with other environmental
policy areas. The literature on risk management includes a long-standing
and robust discussion of the relationship between facts and values. Early
efforts to impose a stark distinction between facts and values have
proven overly simplistic and been replaced by far more sophisticated
discussions. The key insight has been that there is a very large gray area
5
between fact and value, one that Alvin Weinberg called "trans-science.""
In this area, it is necessary to make policy judgments to resolve the
policy-relevant uncertainties. Sound decision making attempts to
explicitly identify the boundaries between science, trans-science, and
policy, and to utilize the appropriate approaches to addressing each. In
articulating policies for the regulations of toxic substances, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration have worked very hard to clarify these
76
boundaries since the late 1970s.
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Forest policy, however, has not been very effective at addressing
these boundary issues. At least one main actor holds a narrow view of
the appropriate role of scientists. For example, in a paper he wrote before
chairing the Committee of Scientists, Johnson defines a "science-based
assessment" as "attempts to use science-driven information and
techniques to answer, or to help answer, questions formulated by
politicians and other policy makers."77 He continues, "Scientists in these
studies are at best hired hands and should not usurp the roles of decision
maker, manager, or individual citizen in weighing public values. 7 8
However, the language and the reasoning used in the report, and the
agency's response to it, are not as clear about which issues are facts,
which are values, and which lie in between. For a planning framework
so intent on integrating the roles of scientists and a broad range of
stakeholders, a clear understanding of these boundary relationships is
very important.
Did the Forest Service in the Clinton administration exceed its
statutory mandate in making ecological sustainability the guiding star
for planning? The agency and the committee argue that doing so is
consistent with the laws guiding the Forest Service since its inception.
There is certainly an element of truth in this, but the Congress of 1897,
1960, or 1976 would certainly not have understood that ecological
sustainability would be pursued to the exclusion of other uses, especially
timber harvesting, in the way that it has over the past decade. The courts
have yet to squarely address this question. In its challenge to the
Northwest Forest Plan, the industry argues that the NFMA viability rule
was contrary to the NFMA statute, but Judge Dwyer waved it away with
a declaratory sentence. 9
Of course it is the responsibility of Congress to establish the
policy objectives of administrative agencies and oversee the activities of
those agencies to ensure that they do not depart from congressional
preferences. But on this issue, Congress has been paralyzed over the past
several decades, and that has created the room for this administration's
assertion of policy. Regional delegations sympathetic to the industry
have obtained temporary relief on several occasions, but the
authorization process is stalemated. Neither side has been able to
overcome the extraordinary majorities necessary to force statutory
change through. What this means is that so long as agencies do not go
outside the comfort zone of most members of Congress, they have a
great deal of latitude for administrative policy making.
During Clinton's administration, the Johnson Committee of
Scientists and the Forest Service did little to help overcome the
legislative stalemate. The committee did not recommend statutory
change, even though it was not shy about an expansive interpretation of
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its mandate in other areas. One could argue that a committee of experts
would have a responsibility to inform Congress that the modern reality
of the contemporary National Forest System was incompatible with the
statutory framework. One could also argue that the expert agency has a
duty to inform its legislative sovereigns in such a case, but the reality of
modern American politics provides the opposite incentives. It is now the
norm for presidents to do everything in their power to use whatever
discretion can be read into statutes to pursue their policy interests,
regardless of congressional intent. Indeed, with the rule on roadless
areas and the chief's directive banning old-growth logging, the NFMA
rules were not even the most extreme case of administrative policy
making in the Forest Service during the Clinton years.
By attempting to cloak those significant policy changes in the
mantle of science, the agency risked delegitimizing science and
undermining the democratic accountability of the system. By asserting
the legitimacy of such changes without congressional endorsement, the
agency also left itself vulnerable to reversal when the new administration
with new forest policy preferences assumed power. This could not be
demonstrated more clearly than by the recent actions of the Bush
administration.
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